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Abstract. Federation in identity management has emerged as a key
concept for reducing complexity in the companies and offering an im-
proved user experience when accessing services. In this sense, the pro-
cess of trust establishment is fundamental to allow rapid and seamless
interaction between different trust domains. However, the problem of es-
tablishing identity federations in dynamic and open environments that
form part of Next Generation Networks (NGNs), where it is desirable
to speed up the processes of service provisioning and deprovisioning,
has not been fully addressed. This paper analyzes the underlying trust
mechanisms of the existing frameworks for federated identity manage-
ment and its suitability to be applied in the mentioned environments.
This analysis is mainly focused on the Single Sign On (SSO) profile. We
propose a generic extension for the SAML standard in order to facilitate
the creation of federation relationships in a dynamic way between prior
unknown parties. Finally, we give some details of implementation and
compatibility issues.
1 Introduction
Federation has emerged as a key concept for identity management. Its main
goal is to share and distribute attributes and identity information across differ-
ent trust domains according to certain established policies. The federation model
enables users of one domain to securely access resources of another domain seam-
lessly, and without the need for redundant user login processes. Particularly, the
most popular use case is Single Sign On (SSO), which allows users to authen-
ticate at a single site and gain access to multiple sites without providing any
additional information. Thus, separating identity management tasks from ser-
vice provisioning is possible in order to reduce complexity in service providers.
So service providers can concentrate on their core business and also improve user
experience when interacting with various administrative domains.
The main actors in a federation scenario, as depicted in Fig. 1, are:
– Service Providers (SPs), entities which consume identity data, they rely on
user authentication made by a third party; SPs are also called Relying Parties
(RPs).
– Identity Providers(IdPs), entities that assert information about a subject;
IdPs are also called Asserting Parties (APs). IdPs focus on authentication
of users and management of identity information, which can be shared with
various SPs.
– Users, which interact (usually via a user agent, e.g. web browser) with SPs.
They are the subject of the assertions.
Fig. 1. Identity federation across two different administrative domains
In this example, sharing identity information between the Mobile Operator
(IdP1) and the Travel Agency (IdP2) allows Bob to log in only once and gain
seamless access to services and applications offered in different domains. By
entering the Maps Service web page, a location-based services offered by the
Mobile Operator, and present his credentials (e.g. username and password), Bob
can follow a link to the Travel Agency web page, and access resources such as
accommodation or restaurant information without re-authentication.
Identity federation implies many advantages, including typical use cases like
cross-domain SSO, user account provisioning, entitlement management and user
attribute exchange. However, current frameworks for identity federation have
not been designed taking into account the requirements of dynamic and open
environments. In these scenarios, companies should have an easy and agile way to
provide services. But establishing relationships between entities is usually hard
to scale, because trust must be preconfigured before any interaction between
parties takes place.
Thus, trust between parties involved in a federation process should be man-
aged in a dynamic fashion, avoiding or minimizing dependence on central admin-
istration and reducing preconfiguration needs. As a direct consequence, service
provisioning and user interaction would be easier and more flexible, facilitating
composition, enrichment and customization.
The remainder of this document is concerned with showing the main chal-
lenges in dynamic identity federation and explaining a generic extension to a
widely known identity standard in order to overcome these challenges. Section 2
reviews current technologies for identity federation and the related work, Sec-
tion 3 provides a comparative analysis of the trust mechanisms underlying these
technologies and Section 4 describes our solution proposal. Finally, Section 5 ex-
plains some implementation issues and Section 6 contains conclusions and future
work.
2 Background
Identity federation can be accomplished by means of formal Internet standards,
such as the OASIS SAML specification [15], or using open source technologies and
other openly published specifications, like the Liberty Alliance Identity Federa-
tion Framework (ID-FF) [13], Shibboleth [9], OpenID [17] or WS-Federation [21].
Next, the main technologies for identity federation are introduced with the aim to
provide a background knowledge to the reader. Also, we include a summary of the
current related work regarding dynamic identity federation.
2.1 Reviewing the Current Solutions for Identity Federation
– Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) defines an XML based
framework to allow the exchange of security assertions between entities.
Basically, SAML specifies four different elements: Assertions, which are
statements related to authentication, attribute, or authorization about a
Principal, issued by an IdP; Protocols, which define how and which Asser-
tions are requested; Bindings, which define the lower-level communication
or messaging protocols (such as HTTP or SOAP) that the SAML Proto-
cols can be transported over; and Profiles, which are combinations of SAML
Protocols and Bindings, together with the structure of Assertions to cover
specific use-cases.
SAML is highly flexible, in fact, all of the above components can be
extended. Furthermore, there is another extension point: the Metadata. The
Metadata can be used to specify how configuration information is shared
between two communicating entities. For instance, these data can include
an entity’s support for given SAML Bindings, identifier information, and
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [5] information.
– OpenID is defined as an open, decentralized, and free framework for user-
centric digital identity. It is based on well-known existing internet technolo-
gies (URI, HTTP, SSL, Diffie-Hellman), and it is clearly oriented to be used
in web scenarios.
A major feature of OpenID is user-centricity, which means that users can
decide which IdP they trust the most to authenticate them. In fact, users can
also become their own IdP without the need of registration or authorization
from a third party. Thus, the OpenID protocol does not rely on a central
authority to authenticate a user’s identity.
But OpenID is mainly an authentication protocol and federation is
achieved with extensions, such as [7] that allows some attribute exchange.
Thus, the OpenID specification is rigidly defined and it only covers a narrow
range of Web SSO use cases. Despite having great benefits, such simplicity
and no preconfiguration requirements before interactions, the main limita-
tions are that trust, security and privacy are still not thoroughly examined.
– Liberty Alliance (LA) was formed with the aim to establish open stan-
dards to easily conduct online transactions while protecting the privacy and
security of identity information. The Liberty specifications, built on top of
SAML, enable identity federation and management through features such as
identity/account linkage, single sign on, and simple session management. The
Liberty Alliance contributed its federation specification, ID-FF, to OASIS,
forming the foundation for SAML 2.0, the converged federation specification
that Liberty now recognizes.
– Shibboleth is a project of the Internet2 Middleware Initiative that has
developed an architecture and open-source implementation for identity fed-
eration based on SAML specifications. It is mainly intended to be used in
educational environments (e.g. to help students and faculty in accessing on-
line shared resources from federated Universities). The Shibboleth software
provides a federated single sign-on and attribute exchange framework, also
including extended privacy functionality and allowing the user’s browser and
their home site to control the attributes released to each application.
– WS-Federation defines mechanisms to allow different security realms to
federate, such that authorized access to resources managed in one realm can
be provided to security principals whose identities and attributes are man-
aged in other realms. This includes mechanisms for brokering of identity,
attribute, authentication and authorization assertions between realms, and
privacy of federated claims. The specification is part of the larger Web Ser-
vices Security framework (WS-*) and describes how to use WS-Trust [23],
WS-Security [22] and WS-Policy [3] all together in order to provide federa-
tion between security domains.
2.2 Related Work
As will be shown in the next section, none of the above solutions define a suitable
trust model to allow dynamic federation establishment. In this sense, there are
various parties working with SAML to allow easy deployment and minimize
mutual beforehand configuration steps.
The Internet2 group, Ping Identity and Stockholm University are working in
Distributed Dynamic SAML [10] [6] to deal with challenges regarding deploy-
ment, scalability and interoperability. They aim to achieve: 1) distribution, in
the sense of changing the operations of typical multi-party SAML federations to
be less dependent on central administration; and 2) dynamism, which implies
various means to support discovery and autoconfiguration instead of static pre-
arrangement between parties. Thus, the group is developing proposals [19] [4]
to be promoted in various communities, including potential submissions to the
OASIS Security Services Technical Committee for consideration as standards.
The main important aspects of their contribution are that the partner keys
used to sign and validate SAML SSO messages are included in the SAML meta-
data document, and trust in these keys is derived from the established trust
in the metadata document itself. Also, the metadata document must be signed
and the X.509 certificate chain used to validate the signature is included in
the document. Thus, each partners trust anchor list just contains the root CA
certificates.
But the idea of relying on signed metadata is quite similar to just relying on
X.509. There are only two ways to establish trust in the metadata signatures:
based on metadata signing certificates together with a traditional PKI or using
out-of-band certificates as a form of pre-shared keys for signature validation. The
proposal is focused on reducing the manual steps but it does not address dy-
namism in the sense of trust establishment and evolution. Although the process
is lighter and federations are established more rapidly, trust continues to lie in
pre-established arrangements, with no evolution over time, and entities cannot
take autonomous decisions without some preconfigured information. Further-
more, the proposal is tied to certificate-based trust decisions and it is focused on
the web SSO profile, but we think that a more general solution is needed that
can be applied to a broader range of federation use cases.
3 Underlying Trust Models: A Comparative Analysis
Comparative studies of different identity management approaches [8] [14] show
the main commonalities and differences regarding many different aspects: design
centers, terminology, specification set contents and scope, user identifier treat-
ment, security, IdP discovery mechanisms, key agreement approaches, as well as
message formats and protocol bindings and trust. Here we aim to take a closer
look at trust issues, because trust is the key to address scalability problems in
the current identity federation systems. We focus this comparative analysis on
the SSO use case because this feature is supported by all the studied identity
management technologies.
As it was mentioned in section 2, SAML specifies a primary trust mechanism
for a SSO operation. It consists of having a pre-existing trust relationship be-
tween the RP and the AP. The trust relationship establishment typically relies
on PKI since it is recommended. Shibboleth adopts this same model so that
federation implies the aggregation of large lists of providers that agree to use
common rules and contracts. The drawbacks of this kind of trust model are well
known: hard to deploy and maintain, and high dependence on central authorities.
In the case of OpenId, trust considerations are not addressed in the main spec-
ification and SSO can be performed between previously unknown parties without
any configuration. However, a new OpenID specification called PAPE (Provider
Authentication Policy Extension) [18], has been recently approved in order to
enforce trust mechanisms. This extension provides means for a RP to request
previously agreed upon authentication policies being applied by the OpenID
Provider and for an OpenID Provider to inform an RP what policies were used.
With PAPE, OpenID moves from a trust-all-comers philosophy to a situation
in which the decision to trust can be based in the knowledge of the employed
authentication mechanism. In other words, there is no trust model specified by
OpenID, RPs must decide for themselves which providers are trustworthy, being
their responsibility to implement any policies related to the OpenID Provider’s
response. For these reasons OpenID is simple, lighter and more scalable.
The trust topologies considered by WS-Federation and LA resemble PKI trust
models between Certification Authorities (CAs). In the case of WS-Federation,
IdPs are equivalent to CAs. In the case of LA, the specification considers two
possible contexts, business agreements and authentication, so IdPs and SPs are
equivalent to CAs depending on the context.
These models are typically implemented by means of trust lists containing
trustworthy authorities and, sometimes, maintaining also lists of untrustworthy
entities. These lists are manually configured by an administrator. Thus, the
establishment of trust relationships is managed with formal contracts specifying
policies and restrictions surrounding this relationship.
In WS-Federation, an administrator or other trusted authority may designate
that all tokens of a certain type are trusted (e.g. all Kerberos tokens from a
specific realm or all X.509 tokens from a specific CA). The security token service
maintains this as a trust axiom and can communicate this to trust engines to
make their own trust decisions.
Liberty bases Identity Federation on the concept of “Circle of Trust” (CoT),
which means that entities must establish business and trust agreements in order
to enable future interactions. Thus, CoTs defined by LA specify different kinds of
trust relationships that can exist between two entities depending on the context.
If the context is authentication, we can have direct or indirect trust relation-
ships. On the other hand, a business relationship can be: pairwise, when directly
links the two entities; brokered, when an intermediary (“broker”) is required; or
community, when no relationship of any kind exists. So Liberty entities have a
TAL or Trust Anchor List with the trustworthy entities for authentication pur-
poses, and also have a BAL or Business Agreement List, containing those parties
which are related to the entity via a business agreement.
Authority lists just allow us to take boolean decisions, which means that if
the list contains an entry for an authority or a trustworthy path to reach it, then
the decision will be positive. On the other hand, if the authority is unknown and
there is no path to it, the decision will be negative. This mechanisms limit inter-
action in open environments, where the presence of unknown users is common
and there is no previous configuration before interaction.
In Table 1 we summarize the main trust features of each identity system. To
conclude, all the analyzed technologies typically handle trust management by
means of trust lists together with PKI. The only exception is OpenID, which
does not require trust relationships to be established and just follows the trust-
and-accept all-comers principle. So, it can be noted that none of the above
identity management technologies include efficient trust models for dynamic en-
vironments, which implies an important challenge. Furthermore, the problem of
establishing trust relationships between previously unknown entities willing to
interact is not covered by none of the current frameworks or specifications.
Table 1. Summary of Trust models in Identity Federation
IdM Technology Trust Model
OpenID No trust model defined, trust-all-comers philosophy, no
preconfiguration required.
SAML PKI recommended. Typically implemented with trust
lists.
Liberty Alliance Trust architecture based on CoTs. Follows SAML rec-
ommendation (PKI). Two relationship contexts: authen-
tication, business. Hierarchical, peer-to-peer, mesh and
hybrid topologies considered. Typically implemented
with trust lists.
Shibboleth Follows SAML recommendation (PKI). Typically imple-
mented with trust lists.
WS-Federation Trust architecture based on WS-Trust. Peer-to-peer,
mesh and hybrid topologies considered. Typically imple-
mented with trust lists.
4 SAML Extension for Dynamic Federation
Trust is a fundamental issue to address scalability in identity management for
open dynamic environments. In fact, the flexibility of every federation frame-
work is tied to the underlying trust model, often poorly defined or even out of
the specifications scope. Our goal is to design and incorporate dynamic trust
models in order to facilitate the interaction between different actors involved in
an identity management system.
A popular approach to addressing security challenges in these environments
is the use of distributed trust mechanisms. By analyzing previously gathered
information, such as certificates or reputation scores, a trust decision can be
made to interact with other entities in the system with some assurance.
After reviewing the current frameworks for identity federation, we conclude
that SAML is the most flexible to add extensions in order to achieve dynamic
federation in a generic way. As described in section 3, all the approaches except
OpenID need trust to be preconfigured. In OpenID, despite there is no need
for previous configuration, the extension mechanism seems to be rudimentary
and less modular. Furthermore, while all the solutions are mainly concerned
with web scenarios and the SSO use case, SAML offers abstraction enough to
be applied to a wider range of situations [20]. Also, SAML is the only standard
nowadays and LA and Shibboleth are based in its specifications, so it is more
logical to introduce modifications in SAML that could be later adopted by other
technologies based on it. But SAML-based federations have challenges scaling
IdP and metadata discovery, protocol binding choice, attribute and nameID
usage, key management and trust establishment.
Therefore, we propose a SAML extension that allows entities to include ex-
ternal trust information but still maintains compatibility with the existing trust
mechanisms that are mostly employed today. The main benefits of this extension
are:
– Minimize dependence on central servers or previous configuration, making
entities more autonomous and capable of taking trust decisions
– Model trust evolution over time, as it has a clear impact in risk management
and trust decisions
– Take advantage of common knowledge, by means of requesting and collecting
reputation information
– Enrich trust mechanisms (not only certificate-based trust but also reputation-
based decision making)
To achieve the above goals we consider that SAML should be extended to allow
the collection of reputation information, which means defining an XML repre-
sentation of reputation data to be included in the Assertions or in the Metadata,
and also describing an exchange protocol for requesting and sending reputation
messages.
SAML is defined in a modular way, by including modifications in the abstract
level we can assure its later application in more specific use cases. With this
philosophy we propose an initial extension model, depicted in Fig. 2.
We present a generic solution, consisting of a SAML extension, as a first
step towards dynamic federation. We focus on the point of trust negotiation
before establishing a federation, which means that entity discovery is out of
scope. Although the aim of this solution is to be generic enough to be applied
to different profiles and use cases, we will focus on analyzing the SSO scenario
to start building a prototype (see section 5).
Basically we introduce the idea of SAML entities maintaining a dynamic store
instead of a static list with trust information. The new Dynamic Trust List
(DTL) is automatically updated according to the establishment and evolution
Fig. 2. SAML Extension for Dynamic Trust Establishment in Identity Federation
of trust relationships. This solution implies modifications to allow gathering of
external trust information and also new functionality must be added to process
these data and manage the DTL. Next, all the new concepts and implications
are detailed.
4.1 Dynamic Trust List
In SAML implementations every entity is usually configured within a TAL before
any interaction between parties takes place. This list contains the digital certifi-
cates associated to every other entity, which is considered trustworthy. Protocol
messages whose digital signature cannot be validated against the TAL are re-
jected. Thus, trust decisions are just boolean. Trust does not evolve over time,
because interaction experiences are not taken into account, community knowl-
edge is not exploited, distrust and ignorance are treated in the same way, and
the automatic establishment of trust relationships between unknown entities is
impossible.
The preconfigured TAL model poses important obvious limitations in dynamic
open environments. Instead of a static TAL, the system maintains an enhanced
Dynamic Trust List with more complete information: entity data and its asso-
ciated trust information (e.g. reputation scores, trust level, previous interaction
results, etc.) and trust material (e.g. keys, credentials, etc.). The list will be
dynamically updated under specific events such as receiving recommendations
from other entities or when a successful interaction ends. In order to allow secure
exchange of trust material, it is required to define key agreement protocols (e.g.
by adding Diffie-Hellman) because these mechanisms are not included in none
of the SAML specifications.
4.2 Trust Engine
In order to include the previously described dynamic features in the process of
trust establishment, SAML entities must be also extended with a trust engine.
This component is the responsible for processing external and internal trust
information and performing DTL updating. Also, decisions to trust will be made
by this logical block.
The internal trust information can be obtained from the DTL. Furthermore,
other data as internal policies could be useful when applying custom trust levels.
e.g. transient or attribute federation may have less requirements than permanent
federation as it implies less personal user identity information disclossure.
On the other hand, external trust information can be obtained from other
entities. To give an example, information can be gathered from entities belonging
to the same domain of the target of federation, or even from entities of different
domains. Such entities may have had a previous relationship with the target
entity (as shown in Fig. 2). In this field, many distributed reputation solutions
have been proposed [11] that can be suitable to implement in top of SAML to
allow trust information exchange.
The trust engine can be enriched with more complex functionality, e.g. by
adding a risk manager or a policy manager block. If we consider timing, analysis
of cached trust material, update policies, etc., a better trust management can
be achieved. To give an example, using policies to determine when to ask for
reputation information offers the capability of implementing different dynamic
trust models, in order to select the more appropiated for each situation.
5 Implementation Issues
In order to evaluate our proposal, we have deployed our own identity manage-
ment infrastructure. As a first phase, we have chosen ZXID [24], a light open C
library that implements the full SAML 2.0 stack, to set up a test scenario. So we
have developed a SP under ZXID. For deploying the IdP, we are using Authen-
tic [2], because ZXID does not include an IdP implementation. Authentic is a
Quixote application. Quixote is a framework for developing web applications in
Python. Authentic is a Liberty-enabled identity provider based on the lasso li-
brary [12] that also supports SAML 2.0 metadata. These libraries use OpenSSL
as underlying cryptographic library and Apache2 as the web server.
Fig. 3. SSO Test Scenario Architecture
The configuration of the mutual trust relationship between the SP and the
IdP has required some slight changes in the SAML metadata generated by them.
In the ZXID libraries, we had to remove the binding POST SIMPLE SIGN because
it is a draft binding that has not been implemented by the lasso yet. Regarding
the IdP metadata, we had to add the inclusion of a complete x509 certificate
instead of the public key like the SAML specification defines.
After the successful integration between SP and IdP, we have tested as the
SSO and Single Logout (SLO) of a user between these two providers is possible.
The user’s identity information only contains a user and password, but this must
be extended to include other kind of credentials. For this, the support of data
managers by ZXID has to be improved, because so far ZXID only supports text
files. The database or LDAP support is a future work, as reflected in the whole
test scenario architecture (Fig. 3).
In the Fig. 3 we can also see that for making authorization decision SAML
is based on XACML [16], which has not been implemented yet. We have our
own XACML-compliant authorization system [1], which has been successfully
deployed and extended for taking into account trust information in the access
control policies. So we are going to integrate our SP with such system to grant
or to deny permissions.
Now, we are firstly including dynamic trust lists (DTLs) and are also devel-
oping services in different administrative domains in order to test more complex
scenarios, interoperability between federation domains, management of the user’s
identity information, etc. In this way, we could test our SAML extensions and
evaluate their performance.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have reviewed the main current frameworks to achieve identity federation,
identifying its main drawbacks to be deployed in dynamic open environments.
Underlying trust models are too rigid to allow an agile way of establishing rela-
tionships between entities, specially when it comes to interaction with previously
unknown parties.
Among all the current approaches, SAML offers the required flexibility, ab-
straction and modularity to be extended for its application in dynamic open envi-
ronments. Thus, we present a SAML extension, which allows not only certificate
based decisions but also reputation based decisions and permits the inclusion of
reputation information in order to take richer trust decisions.
Now, we are implementing the proposed SAML extension, which require to
define a XML syntax to express reputation information, to describe a mechanism
of reputation information request/response, to enhance SAML entities with a
trust engine capable of dealing with dynamic trust lists, and finally to perform
evaluation experiments in a federation scenario.
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